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PREJUDICIAL ERROR: ADMISSIONS AND EXCLUSIONS
OF EVIDENCE IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
ROBERT W. GIBBS t
Introduction.
T HE FOREMAN ROSE to announce the jury's decision. All
parties concerned however were certain that conviction would be
the verdict. The special prosecutor had been masterful throughout
the entire proceeding. What initially appeared to be a close case had
been made one-sided by his eloquence, expertness in the rules of evidence,
and courtroom tactics. Perhaps the prosecutor's most dramatic and
triumphant moment during the three week trial occurred in the midst
of the defense's cross-examination of a key government witness. With
what appeared to be the unrelenting courage of his convictions, govern-
ment counsel strenuously objected to a line of questioning intended to
impeach the witness. He convincingly argued that the questions were
irrelevant, repetitious, and beyond the scope of direct examination.
Persuaded by these forensics, the trial judge sustained the objection.
The words "guilty as charged" were no sooner out of the foreman's
mouth than a host congratulated the heroic prosecutor, the servant of
law and order. Some six months later the court of appeals reversed
the conviction and ordered a new trial,1 holding the aforementioned
restriction of cross-examination to have been prejudicial error.
It is the goal of this Article to answer effectively the following
question: What did the appellate court mean when it said the trial judge
had committed prejudicial errorf 2
t A.B. 1950, University of California: LL.B. 1953. Harvard University Law
School; Law Clerk for Judge William Healy, United States Court of Appeals fcr
the Ninth Judicial Circuit, 1953-1954; Lieutenant, U.S. Army Judge Advocate Gen-
eral Corps, 1954-1957; member of the California Bar.
The writer expresses his sincere gratitude for the unstinting assistance rendered
by Milas C. Bradford, Jr., and Lewis G. Pollock of the Texas and Massachusetts
Bars, respectively, and to Edeltraut Hirsch of Munich, Germany.
1. Federal appellate tribunals are afforded great latitude in rectifying errors or
irregularities arising in the trial court. 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (1952). Where evidence in
the record independent of the prejudicial error is sufficient to sustain the result below,
the case will ordinarily be remanded for a new trial. Labiosa v. Government of the
Canal Zone. 198 F.2d 282, 285 (5th Cir. 1952). The new trial so ordered may be lim-
ited to the issue or issues affected by the error. Accord, Thompson v. Camp, 167 F.2d
733 (6th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 824 (Oct. 11, 1948).
2. The analysis is limited to the federal court cases wherein one or more evidenti-
ary errors of admission or exclusion occurred in the trial court. Though similar con-
(48)
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PREJUDICIAL ERROR
The question's significance can not be overemphasized. The trial
judge is forever concerned with it during trial in attempting to mini-
mize possible prejudice arising from his own questionable rulings '
and in deciding upon motions for mistrial. Ordinarily all trial counsel
do, or should, seek to obviate errors prejudicial to their opponents,
while attorneys confident of success attempt to minimize the prejudice
resulting from such errors once they have occurred. Pessimistic coun-
sel, in the hope of obtaining reversal on review, have been known to
strive to induce errors prejudicial to themselves and to preserve or
create prejudice from errors already committed. And appellate
judges and counsel must be aware of the concept in dealing with both
brief and argument.'
There was a time when many legal authorities thought that liti-
gants were entitled to an errorless hearing in the trial court.' Orthodox
application of such a principle must have entailed incessant effort by
counsel to inject into the record error in some way adverse to their
clients in order to insure a subsequent retrial, if the need should arise.
This predilection to provoke error has not escaped unscathed; of lawyers
so inclined, the following has been said:
"To them it is a fencing contest between counsel, where the
real issue of fact, to-wit, the guilt or innocence of defendant is
lost in the heat of the duel between opposing counsel. The sole
effort is to inject error into the trial." 6
The harm resulting from this misdirection was undoubtedly com-
pounded. Trial judges, in attempting to compensate for the justice-
defeating gyrations of counsel, must have been tediously super-cautious
in deliberation prior to ruling. Endless hearings, frequent rehearings
and resultant high cost of judicial administration could not have been
avoided.
It would be ideal for each losing litigant to have had a perfect
hearing; but the demands of the modern court calendar render any
requirement of this sort impossible. The rule of necessity today is
siderations may be applicable, miscellaneous questions of evidence (e.g., judicial notice,
presumptions and burden of proof) and other problems to which the concept of preju-
dicial error may apply (e.g., jury instructions and misconduct by counsel or judge)
are not treated.
3. Where the trial judge is confronted with a close evidentiary question having
two or more alternative solutions, his ruling may well be affected by the estimated
degree of prejudice likely to arise from either alternative.
4. An excessive number of appellate briefs containing arguments concerning
alleged evidentiary errors fail to discuss whether the errors were prejudicial.
5. 1 WIGMORt, EvIDtNCE § 21 (3d ed. 1940).
6. United States v. Johnson, 123 F.2d 111, 141 (7th Cir. 1941) (dissenting opin-
ion). rezed, 319 U.S. 503 (1943).
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that a party "is entitled to a fair trail but not a perfect one." ' Either
by statute or by judicial decision almost every jurisdiction has adopted
the policy of sustaining a judgment despite one or more errors in the
trial court, if the errors were but technical in nature. This so-called
doctrine of prejudicial error represents a sound practice, leading to a
reduction in the number of appeals and curtailment of the necessity
for fencing among counsel and trial judge, as well as allowing both
counsel and judge better to concentrate on the substantive matters at
issue.8
The current doctrine of prejudicial error is thus a manifestation
of a sound judicial administration. It has been articulated in many
ways, but the following federal legislation is fairly representative: 9
"On the hearing of any appeal or writ of certiorari in any case,
the court shall give judgment after an examination of the record
without regard to errors or defects which do not affect the sub-
stantial rights of the parties." "
"Harmless Error and Plain Error.
(a) Harmless Error. Any error, defect, irregularity or vari-
ance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded.
(b) Plain Error. Plain errors or defects affecting substan-
tial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the
attention of the court." 1
"Harmless Error.
No error in either the admission or the exclusion of evidence
and no error or defect in any ruling or order or in anything done
or omitted by the court or by any of the parties is ground for
granting a new trial or for setting aside a verdict or for vacating,
modifying, or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, unless
refusal to take such action appears to the court inconsistent with
substantial justice. The court at every stage of the proceeding
must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does
not affect the substantial rights of the parties." 12
7. Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 619 (1953).
8. The easing of tension thereby afforded the trial judge may occasionally en-
courage him to be somewhat heedless in his rulings, feeling secure that he is insulated
from reversal. To prevent fruition of such practice, especially where precedent-making
rulings are involved, it might be prudent for appellate courts occasionally to treat an
error as reversible, regardless of the absence of prejudicial error in the usual sense.
See Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 457 (1949) (concurring opinion).
9. See Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 757-763 (1946), for an interest-
ing discussion of pertinent legislative history.
10. 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (1952).
11. F"tn. R. CRIM. P. 52. This rule merely restated pre-existing law. Bihn v.
United States, 328 U.S. 633, 683 n.3 (1946).
12. FD. R. Civ. P. 61. Though criminal rule 52 and this rule are evidently direct-
ed toward federal district courts, they are followed by federal appellate courts as well.
Illinois Terminal R.R. v. Friedman, 208 F.2d 675, 680 (8th Cir. 1953).
I,[VOL. 3: p. 48
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Though these rules are characteristically vague, their thrust is that
reversal should result only where justice would not be served were the
judgment below allowed to stand. But even Socrates found the con-
cept of justice unwieldy. Federal courts have continually attempted
to refine these statutory statements into more practical, specific terms.
The resultant paraphrasing has been immensely varied; but looming
high as a common denominator is the principle that prejudicial error
varies with the error's effect upon the decision "a reached by the trier
of fact. 4
How does the appellate court determine whether an error affected
the decision of the trier of fact? In attempting to answer this question,
it must be recognized that the appellate tribunal's inquiry is ordinarily
restricted to the contents of the record on appeal. !5 Satisfactorily in-
cluding in the record matter relating to improperly excluded evidence
may often prove most difficult. Sometimes the excluded matter's
nature is obvious from the record;' other cases may require an offer
of proof 17 or the excluded document or a summary of the excluded
testimony as an appellate exhibit.'" The reviewing court's examina-
tion may not be so circumscribed if the appellant was deprived of an
opportunity to have the matter included in the record or if the appellee
obstructed inclusion.' And also, where the trial or preparation of the
record was conducted by the appellant without aid of counsel, the
method of review may be liberalized.'
13. The decision deemed to have been affected may be the findings or merely the
amount of the verdict or sentence. United States v. Dressier, 112 F.2d 972, 979-980
(7th Cir. 1940).
14. Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.S. 211, 218 (1946). Language to the contrary
occasionally appears in appellate opinions. In discussing the meaning of prejudicial
error, the Ninth Circuit once stated:
"We must emphasize that, contrary to exhortations of appellee, we do not
test 'manifest injustice' by whether or not we are convinced of appellants' guilt.
The test is rather whether the now contested evidence, in the light of all the facts
of the case before the court, so improperly prejudiced appellants in the eyes of
the jury as to deny them a fair trial and thus require us to reverse, even though,
we might feel that if the contested evidence was deleted, the jury would still have
returned a finding of guilt." Smith v. United States, 173 F.2d 181, 186 (9th Cir.
1949).
15. 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (1952), O'Neal v. Cowles Magazines, Inc., 225 F.2d 43,45
(D.C. Cir. 1955). For the form and content of records on appeal, see the appropriate
federal rules. FED. R. Civ. P. 75 and 76 and FPD. R. CRIM. P. 39(b).
16. Downie v. Powers, 193 F.2d 760, 768 (10th Cir. 1951).
17. Cavanaugh v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 197 F.2d 853, 855 (8th Cir. 1952). It
would appear that trial counsel may make such offer as a matter of right. FED. R.
Civ. P. 43(c), Downie v. Powers, supra note 16.
18. United States v. De Normand, 149 F.2d 622. 625 (2d Cir. 1945). cert. denied,
326 U.S. 756 (Oct. 15, 1945), cert. denied. 330 U.S. 822 (1947), denial of inot~ons for
new trial and to vacate part of sentence aff'd sub nom. Oddo v. United States, 171 F.2d
854 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 943 (June 20, 1949).
19. Edwards v. United States, 312 U.S. 473, 477-78, 481-82 (1941).
20. United States v. Helwig, 152 F.2d 456 (3d Cir. 1945) (alleged exclusion by
deprivation of opportunity to summon witnesses), vacated per citriam and remanded
for perfection of the record, 328 U.S. 820 (1946), rev'd, 159 F.2d 616 (3d Cir. 1947).
NOVEMBER 1957]
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Basic to an appellate court's analysis of a trial record is the as-
sumption that the trier of fact did not perform its duties arbitrarily.
21
So regarding the trier of fact, the appellate tribunal searches the record
for threads of evidence from which it can infer whether the result was
affected by the error under consideration. Enlightening conditions may
and do recur from case to case. A discussion of these recurring situ-
ations or prejudice factors will ensue; but it is well to note that merely
because a factor in one case was held determinative, it need not be
similarly held conclusive of whether the result was affected in another
case. As Mr. Justice Rutledge put it,
"In the final analysis judgment in each case must be influenced
by conviction resulting from examination of the proceedings in
their entirety, tempered but not governed in any rigid sense of
stare decisis by what has been done in similar situations." 22
Prejudice factors relating to errors of admission 2' differ some-
what from those pertaining to errors of exclusion,24 although there are
some factors applicable to both.
21. Goins v. United States, 99 F.2d 147, 151 (4th Cir. 1938), cert. granted, 306
U.S. 623 (1939), cert. dismissed, 306 U.S. 622 (Apr. 17, 1939).
22. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 762 (1946).
23. The phrase, errors of admission, is here used in its broadest sense. The ad-
mission of testimony which is irrelevant, immaterial, incompetent or merely responsive
to an improper question, is an erroneous admission. The improper restriction of a
cross-examiner's efforts to impeach the testimony of a witness may derivatively render
the testimony of the witness on direct an error of admission. Gordon v. United States.
344 U.S. 414, 421-22 (1953). Another example of a derivative error of admission is
the improper exclusion by the trial court of evidence that may have rendered other ad-
mitted evidence inadmissible, as in United States v. Carignan, 342 U.S. 36, 38 (1951),
where evidence of a confession's involuntariness was improperly excluded. The exam-
ination of derivative error cases to see whether the result was affected, logically in-
volves a two step analysis. In Little v. United States, 93 F.2d 401, 406-07 (8th Cir.
1937), cert. denied, 303 U.S. 644 (1938), the appellate court considered separately
whether the improper restriction of cross-examination affected the weight given the
witness's testimony on direct and whether the latter testimony affected the ultimate
result, the jury's verdict.
24. The phrase, errors of exclusion, likewise is all-encompassing, including im-
proper restraint upon questioning of witnesses, erroneous instructions that the jury
ignore certain evidence, and incorrect granting of motions to strike evidence from the
record. There are also derivative errors of exclusion, as when a witness's testimony
is discredited by improperly admitted evidence, which thereby has an excluding effect
on the former. An erroneous denial of a motion to produce evidence has also been
treated as an error of exclusion. Gordon v. United States, 344 U.S. 414, supra note 23
(semble).
The Eighth Circuit recently held that a trial court's sustaining of an "objection"
to evidence after admission was not even an exclusion, since the evidence was not
thereby "stricken from the record or otherwise withdrawn from the jury's considera-
tion." Kelly v. Cordle, 217 F.2d 757, 763 (8th Cir. 1954). The decision, taking the
position that not even an exclusion had occurred, strains the prejudicial error doc-
trine's very spirit of disregarding technical defects; it is far from clear that everyjury member considers evidence in the face of a sustained objection, albeit occurring
after the evidence was received.
[VOL. 3: p. 48
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I.
PREJUDICE FACTORS PERTAINING TO ERRORS OF ADMISSION.
A few of these factors are fairly apparent. If the trier of fact
expressed particular interest in the evidence, its decision may well
have been affected thereby.25 If the evidence was never examined by
the trier of fact, rarely could it be considered to have influenced the
outcome below.26 And where it had probative value only because it
tended to support a result contrary to the one actually reached, there
is little likelihood that such evidence was prejudicial. In Skiskowski
v. United States 27 a federal agent testified that he had confronted the
criminal defendant with a statement by an alleged co-conspirator.
Though the defendant had purportedly nodded while listening to the
statement, after having heard it in toto he unequivocally denied its
truth. There having been no adoptive admission, the testimony was
clearly hearsay and improperly admitted. The court held that, because
it included the defendant's denial, the line of testimony could not have
acted on the verdict and was thus non-prejudicial.
A decision as to whether the evidence pertained to matters in
dispute often disposes of the prejudice question. In Sivert v. Penn-
sylvania R.R.2" the court, in holding that there had been no prejudice,
relied on the fact that the evidence related to a subject not in dispute.29
But where the pertinent matter is in dispute, its magnitude of materi-
ality becomes crucial in determining if the error influenced the result.
A finding of negligible materiality of the question to which the errone-
ously admitted evidence related was dispositive of the prejudice question
in Salerno v. United States.3" The converse may also be true: in a
recent Third Circuit personal injury case, improperly admitted testi-
mony concerning the most material issue, who was at fault, was held
therefore to have been prejudicial. 1  Though the ultimate fact to which
the evidence appertains may be legally immaterial, it may take on
materiality in the eyes of the trier of fact. In the Byler case, 32 a
25. Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.S. 211. 220 (1946) (clarifying instruction
requested by jury).
26. Little v. United States, 93 F.2d 401, 407 (8th Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 303 U.S.
644 (1938).
27. 158 F.2d 177, 180-82 (D.C. Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 822 (1947).
28. 197 F.2d 371, 377 (7th Cir. 1952).
29. A concession by counsel in opening statement rendered a question not subject
to dispute for purposes of prejudice in Dunlap v. United States, 70 F.2d 35, 38 (7th
Cir. 1934), cert. denied, 292 U.S. 653 (June 4, 1934). See also MODEL CODE OF Evi-
D NcF rule 4 (1942).
30. 61 F.2d 419, 421 (8th Cir. 1932).
31. Gordon v. Robinson, 210 F.2d 192, 194 (3d Cir. 1954).
32. Byler v. Wabash R.R, 196 F.2d 9, 11-12 (8th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S.
826 (Oct. 13, 1952).
NOVEMBER 1957]
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personal injury suit under the Safety Appliance Act, 33 defense counsel
in opening argument dwelled on the importance of plaintiff's assump-
tion of the risk and contributory negligence, though neither con-
stituted a defense. Because any resulting misapprehension by the
jury was never rectified during the trial, admission of evidence indi-
cating assumption of the risk Was held to have been prejudicial error.
Another common factor is the degree of persuasiveness possessed
by the evidence. That the evidence has little or no relevance to issues
in dispute usually indicates that its admission did not sway the trier
of fact. 4 Or, if the evidence is of negligible persuasiveness because
of its patent incredibility or the testifying witness's unreliability, preju-
dice is similarly unlikely.85 On the other hand, where the evidence is
highly relevant or its source most dependable, prejudice is more
probable.
Regardless of its immateriality and minimal probative value,
highly inflammatory evidence is frequently considered to have influ-
enced the determination. United States v. Sprengel 8 is illustrative.
Defendants, who had operated one of the notorious Baker heirs or-
ganizations. 7 were charged with and convicted of conspiring to use
and using the mails to defraud. The zealous prosecutor offered evi-
dence that the operators of rival Baker heirs associations had been
convicted of fraud. This was held to have constituted prejudicial error
even though Judge Biggs wrote for the majority, "In our opinion there
can be no question of the guilt of the appellants." 38 Evidence of past
misconduct is similarly treated.89 and this practice is not limited to
criminal cases." A more common example of prejudicial. inflamma-
tory evidence in civil suits is evidence that the defendant in a tort suit
is insured.4 Where highly inflammatory evidence is improperly ad-
33. 35 STAT. 65 (1939), 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1952).
34. Stephan v. United States, 133 F.2d 87, 97 (6th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 318
U.S. 781 (Apr. 5, 1943), appeal application denied, 319 U.S. 423 (June 1, 1943).
35. Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 459 (1949) (dissenting opinion).
36. 103 F.2d 876, 881 (3d Cir. 1939).
37. One Jacob Baker or Becker allegedly had received considerable land in what
is now downtown Philadelphia in return for his services during the Revolutionary
War. Since Baker's estate evidently never had been settled, so the story goes, a num-
ber of organizations arose with the putative purpose of finding the deserving heirs,
representing them in processing their claims, and ultimately obtaining a portion of the
fictitious estate for them. Naturally each newly discovered heir supported the respec-
tive organization financially.
38. 103 F.2d at 879.
39. Sang Soon Sur v. United States, 167 F.2d 431 (9th Cir. 1948). The opinion
suggested an additional, but quite uncontrollable, factor when it stated, "Such an
error must have resulted in prejudice to the appellant, more so perhaps, because of his
nationality and alien status." Id. at 432.
40. Cohen v. Checker Taxi Co., 217 F.2d 449, 452 (7th Cir. 1954).
41. Brown v. Walter, 62 F.2d 798 (2d Cir. 1933). Accord. Gilbert v. Gulf Oil
Corp., 175 F.2d 705, 710 (4th Cir. 1949). But prejudice is not invariable; in Lobel v.
[VOL. 3: p. 48
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mitted, it is usually considered to be prejudicial, unless other evidence
is so overwhelming that the trier of fact would certainly have reached
the same result notwithstanding the error.42 Consistent reversals in
such cases have their salutary effect in discouraging counsel from
succumbing to the ever-present temptation of presenting obviously
inadmissible evidence of this variety.
One of the most recurrent prejudice factor problems is whether
other evidence in the record neutralizes the prejudicial quality of the
improperly admitted evidence. Where other evidence in the record
serves to nullify any inference from the erroneously admitted evidence
adverse to the appellant, there can be no prejudice.' In United States
v. Hefler" a policeman-witness improperly testified to seizing property
from the defendant in the belief that it was "the proceeds of other
larcenies"; however, any prejudice was held removed when the defense
counsel on cross-examination elicited from the same witness an answer
that the property was later discovered to have been legally acquired by
the defendant. If the neutralizing evidence, however, is of a noticeably
lesser degree of persuasiveness than that improperly admitted, the
prejudice may not be considered cured. For example, where evidence
of prior misconduct is improperly admitted, the criminal defendant's
own testimony as to his own good character will not nullify the prejudice
resulting therefrom. 5 Another example of the neutralizing effect of
other evidence is found when there is admissible evidence in the record
to the same effect as that erroneously received in evidence; 4 there
can be no prejudice when the wrongfully admitted evidence is but comu-
American Airlines, Inc., 192 F.2d 217, 221 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 945
(1952), the effect of such evidence was viewed as inconsequential in light of the man-
ifest financial ability of the defendant of record.
42. Templeton v. United States, 151 F.2d 706, 707-08 (6th Cir. 1945). Here the
prosecution elicited from several of the witnesses that the defendant and a number
of his witnesses were related to Hawk Carter, "the notorious bootlegger of Sumner
County."
43. Illinois Terminal R.R. v. Friedman, 208 F.2d 675, 679 (8th Cir. 1953).
44. 159 F.2d 831, 834 (2d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 811 (Apr. 28, 1947).
45. United States v. Modern Reed & Rattan Co., 159 F.2d 656 (2d Cir. 1947),
cert. denied, 331 U.S. 831 (June 2, 1947). A subsidiary point was raised in the case
concerning whether admitted evidence of prior misconduct remained error once the
defendant subsequently put his own character in issue. The court answered in the
affirmative, convinced that the very error had forced the accused to put his character
in issue as rebuttal evidence.
46. An extreme view was taken in Beach v. United States, 149 F.2d 837 (D.C.
Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 745 (Oct. 8, 1945), where other evidence to the same
effect, though technically inadmissible, had been admitted without objection; the latter
was held to have neutralized the prejudice.
Judicial notice concerning the same matter to which the improper evidence relates
may similarly neutralize any prejudice. Freeman-Sweet Co. v. Luminous Unit Co.,
264 Fed. 107, 109 (7th Cir. 1919) (improper admission of uncertified record of which
the court could have taken judicial notice), cert. denied, 253 U.S. 486 (1920).
NOVEMBER 1957]
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lative.47  United States v. Fried " involved a witness who improperly
testified to a conclusion. On cross-examination he explained the factual
basis for his opinion, thereby removing any prejudice. In Masterson
v. Pennsylvania R.R., 9 a personal injury suit, two written medical
diagnoses were incorrectly admitted. Direct testimony to the same
effect by a well-qualified doctor was held to have removed the preju-
dice. And wherever the appellant himself testifies to the same effect
in the trial court, prejudice is generally considered absent."° Note that
if the other evidence has little or no probative value or depends sub-
stantially upon the erroneously admitted evidence for corroboration,
prejudice may remain nonetheless. In Dowdy v. United States "
co-conspirator Martin testified against the defendant. Subsequently,
witness Trexler, a special investigator, was allowed to testify as to
statements incriminating the defendant but made by Martin after being
arrested and therefore definitely after the conspiracy had terminated.
The prejudicial effect of admitting this hearsay evidence was held not
ameliorated by Martin's direct testimony to the same effect, since the
latter's probative value depended to a large extent upon Martin's
corroborating, prior consistent statements about which Trexler had
testified.
Perhaps the most frequently articulated prejudice factor considera-
tion is whether, in a jury trial, the trial judge cured the prejudicial
effect of the erroneously admitted evidence by an appropriate instruc-
tion, during the trial or as part of his charge to the jury, either to
ignore the evidence or to consider it only for proper purposes. Gen-
erally if the trial judge has so instructed, prejudice is held to have
been eradicated.52 In devising these instructions, the trial judge must
be cautious concerning both timing and content. A remark to the
jury immediately after admission of the evidence may be enough,
but, if given later in the trial, it may be ineffective; "' thus, the sooner
the instruction is given, the more likely will the prejudice be cured. 4
Though timely, the instruction may not be curative, if it does not
47. That other evidence to the same effect is or was available, though the record
does not indicate that it was received in evidence or improperly excluded, does not
cure the prejudice. Watson v. United States, 224 F.2d 910 (5th Cir. 1955). But see,
Yoffe v. United States, 153 F.2d 570, 574 (1st Cir. 1946).
48. 149 F.2d 1011, 1013 (2d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 756 (Oct. 22, 1945).
49. 182 F.2d 793, 797-98 (3d Cir. 1950).
50. Kreinbring v. United States. 216 F.2d 671, 673 (8th Cir. 1954).
51. 46 F.2d 417, 425-27 (4th Cir. 1931).
52. Mora v. United States, 190 F.2d 749, 752 (5th Cir, 1951).
53. Jarabo v. United States, 158 F.2d 509, 515 (1st Cir. 1946).
54. United States v. Zeoli, 170 F.2d 358, 360 (3d Cir. 1948).
[ VOL. 3: p. 48
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explicitly apply to the objectionable evidence. 5 An instruction that
is equivocal or does not clearly direct the jury either to totally ignore
the evidence or restrict their reliance on it to the proper limits is equally
impotent. 6 Occasionally the content or repetition of an instruction
may itself create prejudice by causing the jury to overemphasize the
evidence's significance. 7 Sometimes the improper evidence is so
momentous that regardless of the care taken by the trial judge, its
prejudicial effect can not be purged. In the Holt case"8 admission of
a statement by an alleged co-conspirator thoroughly implicating the
defendant was held prejudicial despite the trial court's instructional
efforts. 9 However, where the appellant fails to object to the instruc-
tion, its inadequacies may well be ignored.' Requiring the appellant
to register his dissatisfaction with an insufficient instruction seems
reasonable, since the trial judge is thereby notified either to rectify the
instruction or, where no instruction could be satisfactory, to declare
a mistrial and thus avoid the costs of continuing the trial and prose-
cuting the appeal.
II.
PREJUDICE FACTORS PERTAINING TO ERRORS OF EXCLUSION.
As those relating to errors of admission, some factors are patently
clear. Where the evidence would not have supported a result contrary
to that reached in the trial court, its exclusion can hardly be preju-
dicial."1 And if the record indicates that the trier of fact heard or saw
the excluded evidence, in an offer of proof or otherwise, and was
apparently not particularly impressed therewith, the outcome was
probably unaffected by the error.62
55. Pasquel v. Owen, 186 F.2d 263, 272 (8th Cir. 1950) (semble).
56. Stueber v. Admiral Corp., 171 F.2d 777, 780 (7th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 336
U.S. 961 (Apr. 25, 1949). In Collenger v. United States, 50 F.2d 345, 349 (7th Cir.
1931), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 654 (Oct. 26, 1931), an instruction allowing the jury to
determine the admissibility of the evidence, where the subject of admissibility was
within the exclusive realm of the trial judge, was held not to have removed the
prejudice.
57. Rice v. United States, 149 F.2d 601, 604 (10th Cir. 1945) (jury impressed
by trial judge's repeated instructions to ignore certain evidence).
58. Holt v. United States, 94 F.2d 90, 94 (10th Cir. 1937).
59. The well-meaning prosecutor who offers a confession or other very strong
evidence prior to laying a foundation for admissibility may, in the event that he does
not later succeed in establishing the foundation, find himself in the unenviable position
of having injected incurably prejudicial error into the record.
60. Blodgett v. United States, 161 F.2d 47, 51-52 (8th Cir. 1947). See also
FED. R. Civ. P. 51 and Fen. R. CRIM. P. 30.
61. Chapman v. United States, 194 F.2d 974, 978 (5th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344
U.S. 821 (Oct. 13, 1952).
62. United States v. Compania Cubana De Aviacion, 224 F.2d 811, 822 (5th Cir.
1955).
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An exclusion of evidence relating to a question directly in issue
is more likely to have affected the decision; ' the contrary is true where
the matter has little materiality.64 Frequently the significance of
excluded evidence is exaggerated by words or actions of counsel or
judge. Opposing counsel's dwelling upon the importance of the evi-
dentiary void resulting from an exclusion is one method. Another
was illustrated in Meeks v. United States,65 where the trial judge
repeatedly resisted defendant's efforts to show that a key prosecution
witness was on probation arising from a conviction for forgery; more-
over, the same judge found counsel in contempt for persistently trying
to elicit such testimony.66
The degree of persuasiveness possessed by the excluded evidence
is another important factor. Excluding evidence having only negligible
relevance is seldom considered to be reversible error; 67 where the
excluded testimony would be otherwise unpersuasive, the same may
be said. Thus, in Lindberg Engineering Co. v. Ajax Engineering
Corp."8 the exclusion of testimony by a witness who could have been
easily and convincingly impeached was held not to have been preju-
dicial error. But where the evidence is of obvious persuasiveness,
particularly on a material and disputed issue, prejudice is more likely.69
Finally, where there is other evidence in the record neutralizing
any prejudicial effect resulting from the exclusion, reversible error is
of course not present. If there is ample evidence that would have
overcome any contrary inference raised by the excluded evidence, preju-
dice could not have resulted.7" There can rarely be prejudice if the
excluded matter is itself later received into evidence,7' or is but cumu-
63. Modern Woodmen of America v. Watkins, 132 F.2d 352, 354-55 (5th Cir.
1942) (exclusion of statements by deceased indicating an intent to commit suicide,
where defendant insurer had raised the suicide issue in suit on life insurance policy).
64. Bateman v. United States, 212 F.2d 61, 69 (9th Cir. 1954) (improper im-
peachment of witness whose testimony pertained only to preliminary matters). See
also MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 4 (1942).
65. 163 F.2d 598 (9th Cir. 1947).
66. "It is obvious that the average man in a jury well could conclude that the
government's witness was a person highly respected by a court which, sua sponte,
interrupted and refused to allow an inquiry as to the witness' bias, then refused to
admit the proof of his prior conviction of a crime, followed by the shaming of appel-
lant's attorney before the jury for an entirely proper endeavor to protect his client."
Meeks v. United States, supra note 65 at 601.
67. Curley v. United States, 160 F.2d 229, 238-39 (D.C. Cir. 1947), cert. denied,
331 U.S. 837 (June 2, 1947).
68. 199 F.2d 807, 811 (7th Cir. 1952).
69. In the Meeks case, the appellate court so considered impeaching evidence
that the witness was on probation. 163 F.2d at 599-600.
70. Lindberg Engineering Co. v. Ajax Engineering Corp., 199 F.2d at 811.
71. Deschenes v. United States, 224 F.2d 688, 692 (10th Cir. 1955). The same
is true if the appellant later had been given an opportunity to have the excluded mat-
ter received in evidence but did not avail himself of that opportunity. Walsh v. Bekins
Van Lines Co., 217 F.2d 388, 390 (8th Cir. 1954).
[ VOL. 3: p. 48
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lative to other evidence in the record.72 But where the record indicates
that the excluded evidence would have been more persuasive than or
would have lent needed corroboration to evidence already in the record,
appellate courts are reluctant to state that the result was unaffected
by the error.7"
III.
PREJUDICE FACTORS COMMON TO ERRORS OF ADMISSION
AND EXCLUSION.
A number of these miscellaneous factors do not require extended
discussion. Though a single evidentiary error may not be prejudicial
by itself, an appellate court may nevertheless consider it together with
other errors, evidentiary or otherwise, and determine that their com-
bined effect is prejudicial."4 There may be a temptation to find preju-
dice where a large number of errors occur in a given case, but appel-
late tribunals are generally aware that the question of whether the
result was affected is not necessarily dependent on the number of
errors committed.75 The severity of the decision being reviewed is
undoubtedly another factor,76 as is the prospective duration and ex-
pense of retrial.77 Concessions by trial or appellate counsel concerning
the adverse effect of the erroneous ruling may also be considered.7"
Thus, trial counsel's declaration that certain improperly admitted evi-
dence was of very limited prejudice influenced the Seventh Circuit in
Cherney v. Holmes.79
The locus of responsibility for the error is very often a factor,
though its rationale is exclusively equitable."0 Normally an error is
72 See Wolcher v. United States, 200 F.2d 493, 499 (9th Cir. 1952).
73. Gordon v. United States, 344 U.S. 414, 420-22 (1953) (prejudicially erroneous
exclusion of document though testimony describing contents of document was received
in evidence). But see, Associated Petroleum Carriers, Inc. v. Beall, 217 F.2d 607
(5th Cir. 1954).
74. Wolcher v. United States, 200 F.2d 493, 499 (9th Cir. 1952).
75. Wheeler v. United States, 165 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333
U.S. 829 (1948).
76. United States v. Certain Parcels of Land, 149 F.2d 81, 82 n.7 (5th Cir. 1945).
77. In United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 404 (1927), Mr.
Justice Stone for the Supreme Court stated the following:
"The trial lasted four and one-half weeks. A great mass of evidence was taken
and a wide range of inquiry covered. In such a case a new trial is not lightly
to be ordered on grounds of technical errors in ruling on the admissibility of
evidence which do not affect matters of substance."
78. Confessions of error by government appellate counsel usually lead to reversal.
United States v. Kaplan, 156 F.2d 922, 923 (2d Cir. 1946). This is especially true
where the establishment of precedent is not involved. Casey v. United States, 343
U.S. 808 (1952).
79. 185 F.2d 718, 722 (7th Cir. 1950).
80. This factor is to be distinguished from those which provide inferences as to
whether the result was affected.
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caused by the appellee's trial counsel or the trial judge or both. Where
the former was the cause, due consideration is given if the error was
inadvertent 8 ' or otherwise not in bad faith. 2  If, however, the error
resulted from behavior of the appellant or his counsel, usually reversal
will not follow, apparently because an estoppel-like principle is applied.'
And where the appellant elicited evidence to the same effect as that
offered in evidence by the appellee, though both items may have been
inadmissible, prejudice is held not to be present.84 This laying the
blame on the appellant has sometimes been carried to extremes. In
the Skiskowski case s the reviewing court surmised that retention of
certain inadmissible evidence in the record was integral to appellant's
trial tactics; therefore, the error was in some manner attributed to the
design of the appellant and was held not to have been prejudicial.8 "
When the error demonstrably could not have affected the result,
there is no prejudice. For example, if the trier of fact resolved the
issue to which the error related in favor of the appellant or based its
determination on other grounds, there is no prejudice.8 7  Moreover,
if the result reached was compelled by grounds other than the one
to which the error related, appellate courts will not reverse, notwith-
standing the basis of decision by the trier of fact. 8 In a civil suit
where judgment was entered for the defendant, evidentiary errors
relating solely to the question of damages were not prejudicial.8 9
In criminal cases involving multiple counts, there is no prejudice
where the error could not have affected the sentence, as where the
count to which the error pertained was not one on which the defendant
81. Smith v. Boggia, 200 F.2d 604 (2d Cir. 1952).
82. Gulf, Mobile & Ohio R.R. v. Williamson, 191 F.2d 887, 894-95 (8th Cir.
1951).
83. F. W. Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, Inc., 344 U.S. 228, 231 (1952)(evidence excluded on appellant's own objection) ; United States v. Potash, 118 F.2d
54, 57 (2d Cir. 1941) (appellant's own inadmissible testimony), cert. denied, 313 U.S.
584 (May 26, 1941). The same principle was applied in a related context in Utley
v. United States, 115 F.2d 117 (9th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 719 (1941),
where, after an improper examination by appellee's trial counsel, the trial judge
offered to declare a mistrial. Because the appellant rejected this offer, the appellate
court would not hear the appellant ask for a new trial based on this same error.
84. Smith v. United States, 173 F.2d 181, 185-86 (9th Cir. 1949).
85. 158 F.2d at 182.
86. Generally appellate courts should be wary of speculating as to a trial coun-
sel's tactics. Little v. United States, 93 F.2d 401, 407 (8th Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 303
U.S. 644 (1938).
87. Pennok Oil Co. v. Roxana Petroleum Co., 289 Fed. 416, 420 (8th Cir. 1923)
(findings revealed judgment was based on other grounds). The basis of the findings
may be indicated in a jury's special verdict or answer to interrogatories or in a trial
court's findings or opinion. See FED. R. Civ. P. 49 and 52 and FnD. R. CRIM. P. 23(c).
88. Accord, Kanatser v. Chrysler Corp., 199 F.2d 610, 616 (10th Cir. 1952),
cert. denied, 344 U.S. 921 (1953).
89. Ersler v. T. F. Schneider Corp., 188 F.2d 1022 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
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was convicted, ° was never submitted to the jury,9 ' or was not one for
which the defendant received sentence. 92 Similarly, there is no preju-
dice where, though the defendant was convicted and ostensibly sen-
tenced on the pertinent count, the over-all sentence would have remained
the same even if acquittal on the tainted count had been the result.
Illustrative is where the sentence on the count involved is to be served
concurrently with the sentence on a sustainable count, providing the
former does not exceed the latter in duration." Another is where a
general sentence has been entered on two or more counts, at least one
of which is sustainable, and the general sentence does not exceed the
amount lawful for the sustainable counts.9 4 It seems far from clear,
however, in the case of a general sentence, that conviction on any
given count had no effect on the sentence."6 Moreover, where an error
would have been prejudicial if the case involved a single count indict-
ment, few would claim that the same error would not have had a
prejudicial carry-over effect on the findings of guilty on other counts
in any multi-count indictment case. Attempting to prove a defend-
ant's guilt on one count by improper means is in effect improperly
presenting evidence of a defendant's prior misconduct and should be
similarly treated when prejudice is being considered.9 6
Probably the most controversial prejudice factor is whether, in
the estimation of the appellate tribunal, the result below was correct.
It is elemental that there can be no prejudice where, if the improper
evidence had been excluded or the erroneously excluded evidence had
been admitted, the record would nevertheless have been insufficient to
sustain a contrary result. 7  Equally clear is that there must have been
prejudice where the result below would not have been sustainable if
the error had not occurred.9 8  The difficulty arises where the trier of
fact reasonably could have reached the same or a contrary result, even
if the error had not occurred. Where, absent the error, the appellate
90. United States v. Schenck. 126 F.2d 702, 709 (2d Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 316
U.S. 705 (June 8, 1942).
91. Jones v. United States, 72 F.2d 873 (7th Cir. 1934).
92. Accord, Garber v. United States, 145 F.2d 966, 968 (6th Cir. 1944).
93. Jeffers v. United States, 151 F.2d 587, 589 (5th Cir. 1945).
94. Estep v. United States, 223 F.2d 19, 21 (5th Cir. 1955).
95. The often articulated reasoning is that the trial court is presumed to have
awarded sentence on the good counts only. Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640,
641 n.1 (1946). The more logical presumption is that the trial court assessed a portion
of the sentence for each count of which the defendant was convicted.
96. See note 39 supra.
97. United States v. Borden, 347 U.S. 514, 516 (1954).
98. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 763-64 (946) (insufficient evidence
without erroneously admitted evidence) ; Wetherbee v. Safety Casualty Co., 219 F.2d
274, 275 (5th Cir. 1955) (sufficient evidence to render directed verdict improper, if
improperly excluded evidence had been admitted).
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court considers the record to contain but an unconvincing case in sup-
port of the result, prejudice is likely to be concluded.99 But where the
record if errorless nevertheless would have presented a very strong
case in support of the result,"° or a very weak case in support of a
contrary result,'' prejudice is unlikely.
This factor has occasionally been subjected to considerable criti-
cism. In United States v. Rubenstein 102 the defendant was charged
with conspiracy to bring fraudulently into the country a female alien,
essentially by promoting a mock marriage between her and an American
citizen. Documents and testimony indicating that the defendant, a
lawyer, had subsequently procured a collusive divorce for his "client"
by devising false affidavits and suborning perjured testimony in sup-
port thereof were improperly received in evidence. In concluding that
there had been no prejudice, the majority remarked, "The crime was
proved beyond the faintest peradventure of doubt; it was a deliberate
fraud upon the immigration authorities, without excuse or pallia-
tion." "o Directing his attention to this sentence, Judge Frank's
dissent contains the argument that it was both unsound and unconsti-
tutional for the majority to refuse reversal merely because of the belief
that the result below was correct. 4 The unsoundness, according to
Judge Frank, arises from the obvious fallibility of calculating a de-
fendant's guilt only from the printed page, rather than from demeanor
evidence presented in the trial court as well." 5 The unconstitutionality,
it is argued, results from the possibility that an appellate court may
uphold a conviction, believing it to be correct, though the jury might
have acquitted if the error had not occurred; the end result would then
be contrary to the jury's hypothetical decision and thus there would
occur a denial of the constitutional guarantee of trial by jury.
Judge Frank's dissent is defensible if the majority espoused the
view that he ascribes to them. It is submitted, however, that appellate
courts consider their appraisal of the correctness of the decision below
99. Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.S. 211, 220 (1946).
100. In finding no prejudice, the Supreme Court recently stated: "In view of the
fact that this record fairly shrieks the guilt of the. parties, we cannot conceive how
this one admission could have possibly influenced this jury to reach an improper
verdict." Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 619 (1953).
The record need not "shriek" for this analysis to be apropos; a clear and con-
vincing case in support of the result is likewise a usual basis for determining no
prejudice. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 235 (1940).
101. Miller v. Potomac Electric Power Co., 192 F.2d 614 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
102. 151 F.2d 915 (2d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 766 (Nov. 13, 1945).
103. 151 F.2d at 919.
104. 151 F.2d at 919-25.
105. No matter what the method of analysis for prejudicial error, demeanor
evidence's unavailability to the appellate court is an unavoidable imperfection.
[VOL. 3: p. 48
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not as dispositive of the prejudice question but only as one of the
factors upon which they base their conclusion.1 6 True, the appellate
judge may sometimes determine that, had he been the trier of fact and
the error had not occurred, the same result would have been reached,
and, hence that the decision was correct. Unfortunately, the appellate
judge is never sufficiently acquainted with the triers of fact to deter-
mine intelligently how they personally were influenced by the error.
The appellate judge is thus compelled to presume that the triers of fact,
being persons like himself, would similarly have viewed the decision
reached, and to decide that their decision was unaffected by the error.
The Supreme Court has commented that the appellate judge's assum-
ing the guise of the trier of fact is unavoidable in appellate review. 10 7
Naturally if other factors in the record imply that the actual triers of
fact might well have reacted differently, these factors take precedence." 8
When the record so indicates, the appellate tribunal will ordinarily,
albeit reluctantly, order a reversal.'
IV.
BURDEN OF PROOF ON APPEAL.
Formerly the appellee had the burden of demonstrating the ab-
sence of prejudice once the appellate court was satisfied that error had
occurred."' The current view is that the appellant has the burden
of showing both error and prejudice."' Cases do arise where prejudice
is difficult to demonstrate; under such circumstances a few appellate
courts purport to cast the burden of disproving prejudice upon the
appellee." 2
106. Meeks v. United States, 163 F.2d at 602. But in Mann v. Funk, 141 F.2d
260 (3d Cir. 1944), the court seemed to consider the correctness of the result as de-
terminative that no prejudice occurred. There, medical testimony relating to damages
was improperly admitted but held non-prejudicial, solely because the amount of the
verdict was not considered excessive or, in other words, was considered to be within
the correct range of recovery.
107. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 763 (1946).
108. The Ninth Circuit has indicated that, though it is not conclusive of the
prejudice question, the appellate tribunal's appraisal of the correctness of the decision
below is a very strong factor. Simons v. United States, 119 F.2d 539, 559 (9th Cir.
1941), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 616 (Oct. 13, 1941). My personal observation is that the
longer the record the more significant is the appellate tribunal's examination of the
correctness of the decision below.
109. In reversing a conviction, the Third Circuit once related that "there can be
no question of the guilt of the appellants." United States v. Sprengel, 103 F.2d at 879.
110. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 82 (1935); Sang Soon Sur v. United
States, 167 F.2d 431 (9th Cir. 1948). Unlike now, it was then to the appellant's ad-
vantage for the record not to indicate the nature of impronerly excluded matter.
Contra United States v. Andolschek, 142 F.2d 503. 506 (2d Cir. 1944).
111. Sang Soon Sur v. United States, su/ra note 110.
112. United States v. Dressier, 112 F.2d 972, 978 (7th Cir. 1940). The Seventh
Circuit however seemed to revert completely to the old view in Worcester v. Pure
Torpedo Co., 127 F.2d 945, 947 (7th Cir. 1942), where it stated, "Filt is well settled
that a reversal will be directed unless it appears, beyond doubt, that the error com-
plained of did not and could not have prejudiced the rights of the party."
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Of what must the appellant persuade the appellate court to obtain
a reversal? In attempting to answer this question, it becomes evident
that judicial opinions vary greatly among appellate courts. Some
require only that the appellate tribunal be convinced that the error
"may" have affected the result." 8 Others indicate that prejudice is
present only when the error was, in relation to the decision below, a
"determining factor" 114 or had more than a "very slight effect"; ..
and some opinions dwell on the necessity of showing that the error had
"substantial influence." "' Though these verbal differences seem to
be formal rather than substantive, one can not escape the suspicion
that in a given case the outcome of appellate review could well differ
depending on the verbal formula used. Regardless of whether these
differences in approach are more apparent than real, it is clear that
the appellant has a heavier-than-usual burden of proof under the fol-
lowing two circumstances: when suitable objection to the error was
not made in the trial court 11 and, with respect to errors of admission,
when the trial judge sat as the trier of fact." 8
A.
Suitable Objection Not Made at Trial.
"An objection to testimony not made in the trial court cannot be
urged for the first time on appeal," "' unless there was no opportunity
to make any objection.' This rule definitely applies to the review
113. Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 445 (1949).
114. Sang Soon Sur v. United States, 167 F.2d 431, 432 (9th Cir. 1948).
115. Accord, Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764 (1946).
116. Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.S. 211, 218 (1946). See also MonmL CoDE
or EvIDENcE rules 6 and 7 (1942). Occasionally an opinion will contain language that
an error is prejudicial if it "probably induced a different" result than would otherwise
have been reached. United States v. Compania Cubana De Aviacion, 224 F.2d 811,
822 (5th Cir. 1955).
117. Raising the error in the trial court is to be differentiated from properly
raising it on appeal. Failure to comply with the appellate tribunal's court rules or
otherwise failing adequately to raise the error on appeal may preclude review, but
the appellate court may disregard such defects. Zimmerman v. Emmons, 225 F.2d 97,
99 (9th Cir. 1955).
118. There seems to be no significant differences in the burden of proof relating
to civil and criminal cases as such. 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (1952). See also MODEL CODe OF
EVIDENcE rules 6 and 7 (1942). Language in Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S.
750, 762-63 (1946), however, does suggest a smaller quantum required in criminal
cases involving deprivations of life or liberty.
119. Kreinbring v. United States, 216 F.2d 671, 673 (8th Cir. 1954). See also
MODXL CODE or EVIDENcE rules 6 and 7 (1942).
120. FxD. R. CRIM. P. 51 and FED. R. Civ. P. 46. Appellant's failure to object
was disregarded in Williams v. United States, 93 F.2d 685, 690-91 (9th Cir. 1937),
where the trial judge's examination of a witness gave rise to the error; the appellate
court opined that the inevitable friction between the trial judge and counsel, had an
objection been made, was tantamount to a denial of an opportunity to object.
.64 [VOL. 3: p. 48
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of civil cases; 121 but it is not necessarily as controlling in criminal
cases.' 22 With respect to the latter, the requirement is apparently
relaxed where a particularly severe sentence is involved '2 or where
the error was "plain." 124
To obtain a reversal in the balance of criminal cases wherein ob-
jection was not properly made, the appellant must muster a larger
quantum of proof that the error affected the result, than is otherwise
required to show prejudice.' 25 Inflicting this heavier burden upon the
appellant is eminently just and practical. Trial counsel are en-
couraged to notify the trial court of errors, thereby permitting the
latter an opportunity to remedy the same; at the same time, the rule
is not so harsh as to deny the appellant justice in particularly clear
cases of prejudice. 2  It is difficult to measure the additional proof
thereby required, and this greater burden has been variously described.
One court strives to determine if the error "so improperly prejudiced
appellants in the eyes of the jury as to deny them a fair trial," 127 while
another inquires whether the errors "seriously affect the fairness, in-
tegrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings"; "' and a third
seeks to determine if the error's "natural and probable influence upon
the jury was prejudicial." 129
For counsel successfully to avoid this greater burden, he must
bring the error to the attention of the trial court properly both in time
and in form. Timeliness requires that the objection be made at the
earliest opportunity arising after the error is committed and could
reasonably be ascertained.3 Trial counsel, once having made a timely
121. Knight v. Loveman, Joseph & Loeb, Inc., 217 F.2d 717 (5th Cir. 1954).
But cf. Mondshine v. Short, 196 F.2d 606 (5th Cir. 1952) (failure to object to in-
structional error).
122. Smith v. United States, 173 F.2d 181, 184 (9th Cir. 1949).
123. Stephan v. United States, 133 F.2d 87, 89-90 (6th Cir. 1943) (death sen-
tence), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 781 (Apr. 5, 1943), appeal application denied, 319 U.S.
423 (June 1, 1943).
124. FVD. R. CRIM. P. 52, United States v. Jones, 204 F.2d 745, 749 (7th Cir.
1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 854 (Oct. 19, 1953).
125. Robertson v. United States, 171 F.2d 345 (D.C. Cir. 1948) (reversal though
trial court could have cured prejudice). In cases wherein the appellant fails to object
to an erroneous ruling, or to an inadequate curative instruction, the appellate court
is confronted with two policy considerations: to discourage the withholding of objec-
tion in the trial court and to reverse where the result was likely to have been affected
by the error. Requiring a greater burden of proof in such cases seems to satisfy both
policies. But some opinions seem to indicate that the former policy is foremost in im-
portance and that appellate courts will affirm regardless of the amount of prejudice
involved. Yoffe v. United States, 153 F.2d 570, 574 (1st Cir. 1946).
126. Barnes v. United States, 215 F.2d 91 (9th Cir. 1954).
127. Smith v. United States, 173 F.2d 181 (9th Cir. 1949).
128. Blodgett v. United States, 161 F.2d 47, 52 (8th Cir. 1947).
129. Robertson v. United States, 171 F.2d 345, 346 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
130. Marx v. United States, 86 F.2d 245, 251 (8th Cir. 1936). Respecting evidence
obtained through an improper search or seizure, the motion to suppress should or-
dinarily be made before trial. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41 (e).
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objection, will not be required to reiterate his objection to the same
error 131 or later identical errors.' 2  In addition to timeliness, the
objection must adequately apprise the trial court of the ruling which is
allegedly in error 188 and the specific basis for objecting,' 4 and the
theory of objection must have been legally correct.' 5
B.
Judge Sat as Trier of Fact.
With respect to the review of errors of admission, language of the
following sort is not uncommon in appellate opinions: "Since no jury
was present, the reception of incompetent evidence would not be
prejudicial. ," 18 Although such unqualified statements are
commonplace where the decision below is affirmed without much ado,
longer and more detailed opinions are more moderate in approach. In
Harper v. United States 137 the Eighth Circuit stated, "Where an
action at law is tried before a court, error in receiving evidence over
objection is ordinarily regarded as harmless and not grounds for re-
versal." (emphasis added.) To show prejudice in cases tried before a
judge, the appellant must affirmatively establish first that the trial
court considered the inadmissible evidence in reaching his decision.'
Once having done so, he must shoulder the standard burden of showing
that the evidence, so considered, affected the result."8 9  The additional
prerequisite seems justifiable. 4' In a jury trial it may be presumed
131. Collenger v. United States, 50 F.2d 345, 349 (7th Cir. 1931). But if the
evidentiary error becomes apparent only after the objection has been made, the objec-
tion is premature and must be repeated. In Skiskowski v. United States, 158 F.2d
at 182, the court held untimely counsel's objection to testimony which, at the time, ap-
peared to be admissible as an adoptive admission, though subsequent testimony showed
it to have been inadmissible hearsay.
132. Dowdy v. United States, 46 F.2d 417, 426 (4th Cir. 1931).
133. United States v. Rubenstein, 151 F.2d at 918 (objection directed to large
body of evidence of which the erroneously admitted items were only a part).
134. Een v. Consolidated Freightways, 220 F.2d 82, 87-88 (8th Cir. 1955) ("in-
competent, irrelevant, immaterial, calling for speculation, guess and conjecture" held
too general).
135. Knight v. Loveman, Joseph & Loeb, Inc., 217 F.2d 717 (5th Cir. 1954)
(valid ground for objection not raised until appeal).
136. Daniel v.. United States, 127 F.2d 1 (8th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S.
641 (Oct. 12, 1942).
137. 143 F.2d 795, 803 (8th Cir. 1944).
138. Safety Motors, Inc. v. Elk Horn Bank and Trust Co., 217 F.2d 517, 522
(8th Cir. 1954).
139. United States v. Compania Cubana De Aviacion, 224 F.2d 811, 821 (5th Cir.
1955).
140. Of course, if the record without the inadmissible evidence does not support
the finding below, appellant need not show that the evidence influenced the judge.
Grandin Grain & Seed Co. v. United States, 170 F.2d 425, 427 (8th Cir. 1948).
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that the lay triers of fact consider all of the evidence of record, admis-
sible and inadmissible alike, in reaching their verdict, since that is
normally their duty; but where the trier of fact is a legally trained
judge, a contrary presumption may well be valid.141 There are a num-
ber of ways by which the appellant can rebut this presumption. The
trial judge may have indicated his reliance upon the evidence during
the trial or in an oral opinion.'42 The judge's findings 14 and written
opinion, if any, are other sources for the appellant.
V.
REVERSIBLE ERROR REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THE RESULT
WAS AFFECTED.
Especially in criminal cases, some evidentiary errors seem to
result in reversal without any determination whether the result was
thereby affected. The major exemption from the doctrine of prejudi-
cial error in its usual application lies in the field of constitutional rights
in their evidentiary manifestation."' Reversal apparently follows re-
gardless of the error's consequences, where 14 evidence obtained
through an improper search or seizure is admitted,14 where the record
contains evidence obtained through "brutal conduct" by police offi-
cials, 147 or where a coerced confession is admitted into evidence. 4
Reversal similarly results where the evidentiary error is a transgression
141. Fotie v. United States, 137 F.2d 831, 839 (8th Cir. 1943).
142. Fotie v. United States, supra note 141.
143. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a) and FED. R. CRIM. P. 23(c). Where "special find-
ings" are required by the pertinent rule, 'they should be in sufficient detail to allow
the appellate court to determine which evidence influenced the trial court. Irish v.
United States, 225 F.2d 3, 7-8 (9th Cir. 1955).
144. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764-65 (1946).
145. Violations of the hearsay rule as such have never been exempted from the
usual prejudicial error doctrine, though they frequently seem to involve infringements
of the sixth amendment right of confrontation. Fotie v. United States, 137 F.2d 831,
839-40 (8th Cir. 1943).
146. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948). The McDonald case illus-
trates quite well the different analysis appropriate to the violation of a constitutional
right. Once the court had determined that there had been error, reversal as to co-
defendant McDonald, whose right had been violated, followed summarily; as to co-
defendant Washington whose right against unreasonable searches and seizures had
not been violated, the court found prejudicial error only because, absent the improperly
admitted evidence, there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction. Id. at 456.
147. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (morphine capsules obtained by
forcing emetic into defendant's stomach). The court did state that the capsules were
the chief prosecution evidence, but the balance of the opinion indicated that reversal
would have followed were such not the case. Id. at 166 and 172-74.
148. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 475 (1953). Courts have a tendency to rely
on more than one string to their bow; and, for this reason, holdings clearly premised
on the reversal per se doctrine are rare indeed. An opinion initially may reverse be-
cause a coerced confession was admitted in evidence and later point out that the con-
fession undoubtedly affected the result. Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181, 190 (1952).
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of certain statute-founded fundamental rights,4 ' such as the introduc-
tion of evidence obtained contrary to the Federal Communications
Act "o or in violation of the protections afforded those who are com-
pelled to testify before a congressional committee. 5 ' Though one
would expect the receiving of a confession obtained during illegal de-
tention contrary to the McNabb rule 152 to be so treated also, it appears
that such an error does not require reversal per se.'55
The beneficial effect of a summary reversal once error has been
determined in these fundamental rights cases is unmistakable. The
practice simplifies and expedites the review of criminal cases, for
evidence obtained at the expense of constitutional or other basic
guarantees is almost invariably prejudicial. But of primary impor-
tance, one can think of few better methods of discouraging subse-
quent infringements of cherished rights; '" further, affirming despite
such constitutional violations might well be interpreted as a sanctioning
of reprehensible evidence-gathering methods.'55
A Supreme Court decision in the October, 1952 Term has been
construed by some as implicitly defeating the policy underlying this
reversal per se doctrine. 6 In the Stein case an allegedly coerced con-
fession was received in evidence, and the trial court later instructed the
jury to consider the confession only if believed to have been volun-
tary. 57  The United States Supreme Court determined the confession
not to have been coerced, thereby negating any error even if it had been
unqualifiedly received in evidence.'58 By way of dicta, the opinion stated
that no error, and hence no reversal, would have resulted if the jury
determined the confession to have been coerced, evidently assuming that
the jury would have complied with the trial court's instruction to ignore
the confession.' The fallacy of the majority's reasoning lies in the
149. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764-65 (1946).
150. 48 STAT. 1103 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1952), Weiss v. United States, 308
(J.S. 321, 331 (1939). But see, Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379, 380 (1937).
151. 18 U.S.C. § 3486 (1952), Adams v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 179 (1954).
152. FD. R. CRIM. P. 5(a), McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
153. Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S. 410, 411 (1948).
154. Stein v. New York 346 U.S. 156, 201-203 (1953) (dissenting opinion). If
the tainted evidence is not introduced at the trial, the doctrine of summary reversal as
well as much of its necessity, is inapplicable. Roscoe v. United States, 148 F.2d 333
(6th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 890 (June 18, 1945).
155. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173-74 (1952).
156. Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 197-208 (1953) (dissenting opinions).
157. Id. at 170.
158. Id. at 188.
159. Id. at 192.
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ill-founded premise that all jury-members can or will comply with the
trial judge's instruction once having seen the confession. That some
or most of the jurors would obediently discard the confession, while
a few would not, is little consolation to a convicted defendant. By
approving the practice of admitting a confession and allowing the jury
to later determine its voluntariness, the Stein case may be permitting
the prosecutor to profit somewhat from obtaining a coerced confession.
Certain qualifications to the reversal per se doctrine are reported
occasionally. Where the criminal defendant has made a judicial con-
fession ... or where another confession having considerable reliability
is properly admitted,'' no reversal will follow. Rule 52(b) 112 permits
review of evidentiary errors involving fundamental rights, though no
objection was registered in the trial court; however, some authorities
indicate that where the appellant was remiss in failing to object, he
must shoulder the normal burden of proving that the result was
thereby affected," unless the deprivation of the fundamental right
was so patent as to reduce the very trial to a mockery.'
CONCLUSION.
Trial counsel with enthusiasm to help their respective clients often
fail to appreciate the significance of error that has been injected into
their records. Throughout a trial they should be guided by certain
habits of thought, of which appellate counsel should also be cognizant
in making argument on review.
Some errors seem to require summary reversal; these infringe-
ments of fundamental rights should be avoided at all costs. The bal-
ance, constituting the greater number by far, afford trial counsel a
certain margin of safety. Once an error of the latter variety has oc-
cured and been detected, each counsel must make a value judgment.
The offended party, after having made his record,"5 must determine
whether to preserve or minimize the prejudice resulting. Essentially
the problem is one of trial tactics. He should preserve, but never pro-
160. Butler v. United States, 138 F.2d 977, 980 (7th Cir. 1943).
161. Wheeler v. United States, 165 F.2d 225, 230-31 (D.C. Cir. 1947), cert. de-
nied, 333 U.S. 829 (1948). But see, Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181, 190 (1952).
162. FxD. R. CRIM. P. 52.
163. Schowers v. United States, 215 F.2d 764, 766 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (absence of
objection to trial judge's failure to instruct concerning voluntariness of confession).
164. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 286-87 (1936).
165. i.e. properly registered an objection and, if an erroneous exclusion, insured
that the record indicates the nature of the excluded matter.
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mote, the prejudice if prospects of a successful outcome are poor or do
not, in his opinion, depend on the matter to which the error relates.
Opposing counsel must make a similar decision.
After counsel has determined the most advantageous course of
action, he should attend to and utilize the appropriate prejudice factors.
Thus, the analysis contained in these pages is intended to be a guide
for trial counsel, as well as a study of an appellate review process.
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